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Turning the Lab into Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon 









The most famous element in Bentham’s theory of punishment, the Panopticon Prison, expresses 
his view of the two purposes of punishment, deterrence and special prevention. We investigate 
Bentham’s intuition in a public goods lab experiment by manipulating how much information on 
punishment experienced by others is available to would-be offenders. Compared with the tone 
that Jeremy Bentham set, our results are non-expected: If would-be offenders learn about contri-
butions and punishment of others at the individual level, they contribute much less to the public 
project. Our results confirm the special prevention effect but show that the deterrence effect is 
smaller the more information on individual punishment is available. 
Keywords: Punishment, Deterrence, Special Prevention, Jeremy Bentham, Experiment,  
Public Good 
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I. Research  Question 
Not many scientific achievements are cast in stone. Jeremy Bentham’s theory of punishment is 
among the rare exceptions. Inspired by his younger brother Samuel, a naval architect based in 
Russia in the 1780s, he translated his theory into a blueprint for the design of prisons (Semple 
1993). Over time, all over the world some 20 "panopticon" prisons have been built
1. The basic 
idea is simple. The circular construction places each and every inmate under permanent control 
by the supervisor, located at the centre. Every spectator cannot but realize that prisoners have 





Jeremy Bentham’s Design of the Panopticon 
 
 
The architecture implements the purpose punishment is supposed to serve (Bentham 1830:Book 
V Chapter III): 
“Hence the prevention of offenses divides itself into two branches: Particular preven-
tion, which applies to the delinquent himself; and general prevention, which is appli-
cable to all the members of the community without exception. 
General prevention is effected by the denunciation of punishment, and by its applica-
tion, which, according to the common expression, serves for an example. The pun-
ishment suffered by the offender presents to every one an example of what he him-
self will have to suffer if he is guilty of the same offense. 
General prevention ought to be the chief end of punishment, as it is its real justifica-
tion. [...] The punishment inflicted on the individual becomes a source of security to 
all. [...] That punishment, which, considered in itself, appeared base and repugnant to 
all generous sentiments, is elevated to the first rank of benefits, when it is regarded 
                                        
1   University College London, Bentham Project and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panopticon. 3 
not as an act of wrath or of vengeance against a guilty or unfortunate individual who 
has given way to mischievous inclinations, but as an indispensable sacrifice to the 
common safety” (Bentham 1830:Book I Chapter III). 
In this paper we investigate Bentham’s intuition of special prevention and general prevention 
(deterrence) in a lab experiment. A lab experiment has the decisive advantage to give us full con-
trol over the institutional setting. We can therefore manipulate how much information on pun-
ishment experienced by others is available. Additionally, we can unambiguously see whether and 
to which degree subjects are well-behaved, and whether or not they change their behavior after 
having observed or experienced punishment. Our “work-horse” is a standard public goods game, 
that has already been extensively investigated (Ostrom, Walker et al. 1992; Fehr and Gächter 
2000; Fischbacher and Gächter 2009). Four players interact over 10 periods. In each period they 
can contribute to a public good. The individual return of each player from one unit of contribu-
tion, i.e. the marginal capita return, is such that from an individual perspective it is unprofitable 
to contribute. However, since all players benefit, full contribution would maximize total profit. 
In a second stage of each round, a fifth player observes the individual contributions and, based 
on this information, can punish each of the four players who can make contributions. Punishing 
is costly for the fifth player, i.e., she must invest her own money if she decides to diminish the 
payoff of one or more of the others. All five players individually have the same return from the 
public good irrespective of whether or not and how much they contributed. 
To investigate Jeremy Bentham’s idea, we manipulate feedback. In the low treatment, contribu-
tors only learn aggregate contributions. In the medium treatment, they also learn aggregate pun-
ishment. In the high treatment, they know individual contributions and individual punishment. 
As a further test, we invite another group of four contributors for another 10 periods. The group 
supervisor stays in office. Before the second group starts playing, graphs inform them about their 
predecessor’s performance. The information about the contributions and, if applicable, about 
punishment in the first 10 periods is the same as was given to contributors during the first phase. 
Also the degree of feedback is kept constant across phases. For instance if feedback was low in 
phase 1, the group of successors is not informed about punishment either, neither with respect to 
their predecessors, nor with respect to other players of the current group. 
Compared with the tone that Jeremy Bentham set, we have a non-expected result: punishment 
information is at best immaterial. If bystanders learn both behavior and correctional responses at 
the individual level, they contribute much less to the public project. However, punishment does 
not miss its intended effect, neither on those punished themselves, nor on bystanders. Yet the 
effect is indirect. Bystanders and newly arrived group members are mainly influenced by the 
observed previous contribution levels in their groups that, of course, have been affected by pun-
ishment. 4 
II. Related  Literature 
Behavior in our work-horse setting exhibits a robust and well-known pattern. In the absence of 
punishment, players contribute significantly in the beginning, but contributions decay quickly 
(for summaries see Ledyard 1995; Zelmer 2003). More recent studies show that contributions 
stabilize if subjects are given a chance to punish each other after having observed individual con-
tributions (for a summary see Herrmann, Thöni et al. 2008). In this literature, punishment is typi-
cally decentralized. Few experimental studies use centralized punishment, but they focus on dif-
ferent research questions. For example, they investigate whether unaffected outsiders are willing 
to spend money for disciplining others (Fehr and Fischbacher 2004), how leaders can motivate 
members of their team by the threat of punishment (Güth, Levati et al. 2007; Gürerk, Irlenbusch 
et al. 2009), whether centralized punishment develops endogenously when players can voluntar-
ily join a sanctioning institution (Kosfeld, Okada et al. 2008), how centralized punishment af-
fects behavior in a threshold public goods game (Guillén, Schwieren et al. 2006), and how mild 
central sanctions interact with social norms (Tyran and Feld 2006; Galbiati and Vertova 2008b; 
Galbiati and Vertova 2008a) Putterman, Tyran, and Kamei (2010) are able to choose efficient 
formal sanctions by voting.  
Very few experimental studies investigate the impact of information about others’ behavior (also 
called “social history”) on own behavior. (Berg, Dickhaut et al. 1995) find that providing a social 
history increases cooperation in their trust game setting. (Fehr and Rockenbach 2003), however, 
do not find a change in subjects’ behavior in a gift exchange game with punishment. Informing 
responders about the average offers before they decide whether to accept or reject their specific 
offer seems to significantly increase offers and offer-specific rejection probabilities (Bohnet and 
Zeckhauser 2004). In a binary dictator game (Krupka and Weber 2009) find that showing sub-
jects what others actually do produces more pro-social behavior. Interestingly, this is even the 
case when observed subjects are mostly selfish. They also find support for an informational ef-
fect: observing more people behaving pro-socially generally produces more pro-social behavior. 
We are not aware of any study that investigates the influence of information about others’ behav-
ior in a public good setting with punishment. 
There is a growing body of experiments in criminology (for summaries see Farrington 2003; 
Nagin and Pogarsky 2003; Petrosino, Turpin-Petrosino et al. 2003; Farrington and Welsh 2005; 
Farrington and Welsh 2006; Petrosino, Kiff et al. 2006). Many are quasi experiments in the field 
(Farrington and Welsh 2006). Apparently though no experiment has tried to assess the effect of 
punishment on true outsiders to the criminal system (cf. the comprehensive survey by Farrington 
and Welsh 2006). 
In modern parlance, Jeremy Bentham proposes deterrence. The deterrence literature is rich (for 
summaries see Cameron 1988; Ehrlich 1996; Nagin 1998b; Nagin and Pogarsky 2001; Sherman 
2002; Levitt 2004; Matsueda, Kreager et al. 2006). There is widespread consensus that punish-
ment has an effect on non-criminals (Andenaes 1974; Gibbs 1979; Katyal 1997:2444; Frase 
2005:69). Specifically the social benefit from punishment is not confined to incapacitation, i.e. to 5 
keeping would-be criminals behind prison doors (Blumstein, Cohen et al. 1978; Levitt 1998; 
Nagin 1998a; Kessler and Levitt 1999). Most empirical researchers find that increasing the cer-
tainty and the celerity of punishment reduces crime rates more strongly than greater severity 
(Cramton 1968; Gibbs 1968; Glass 1968; Schwartz 1968; Tittle 1969; Bean and Cushing 1971; 
Chiricos and Waldo 1971; Logan 1972; Ehrlich 1973; Erickson and Gibbs 1973; Silberman 
1976; Witte 1980; Sherman and Berk 1984; Paternoster 1989; Trumbull 1989; Grogger 1991; 
Pogarsky 2002; Robinson and Darley 2004; Tonry 2006).  
Much empirical effort has been devoted to showing that and how the objective certainty, celerity 
and severity of sanctions is modulated by perception (Williams and Hawkins 1986; Paternoster 
1987; Nagin 1998b; Anderson 2002; Piquero and Pogarsky 2002; Pogarsky, Piquero et al. 2004; 
Wright, Caspi et al. 2004; Matsueda, Kreager et al. 2006). The difference can be pronounced. 
For instance, one interview study with prison inmates showed that 76% of active criminals, and 
89% of most violent criminals, either perceive no risk of apprehension or are incognizant of the 
likely punishment (Anderson 2002:295). 
One particularly troubling finding has been called the resetting effect. Empirically, those who 
have been punished in the past not so rarely increase rather than decrease criminal behavior 
(Piquero and Paternoster 1998; Piquero and Pogarsky 2002; Pogarsky and Piquero 2003). A 
prominent explanation for this observation is Bayesian updating. Through the one experience 
with the judicial system, offenders learn that the probability of arrest, conviction and enforce-
ment is smaller than expected, and that they suffer less from the sanction than they thought 
(Paternoster, Saltzmann et al. 1983; Nagin 1998b:15 f.). If this experience spreads, the collateral 
damage of criminal justice is even larger. Also criminals cannot be stigmatized twice, which is 
why the opportunity cost of the second sanction is lower (Harel and Klement 2007). Through 
stigma, the prospect for earnings from legal occupation have decreased (Schmidt and Witte 
1984). 
III. Hypotheses 
Our first hypothesis translates Jeremy Bentham’s proposal into our setting: 
H1: The more punishment is visible, the higher are contributions.  
From the more recent literature in criminology, we derive 
H2: The more punishment is severe, and the more it is consistent, the higher are contributions.  
Jeremy Bentham’s proposal is rooted in his conviction that would-be criminals are also sensitive 
to foreign experiences with the criminal system. This triggers 
 6 
H3: Those not punished in the past contribute at least as much to the public project as those pun-
ished. More detailed information about contributions and punishment of predecessors has a 
favorable effect. 
IV. Experimental  Design 
324 students (149 female) from a variety of majors participated in an experiment conducted at 
the Econ Lab of Cologne University in December 2008. The experiment was implemented in 
zTree (Fischbacher 2007). Participants were invited using Orsee (Greiner 2003) and were ran-
domly assigned to treatments.
2  
Participants played ex ante announced 10 rounds of a standard public goods game in anonymous 
groups of four (called “players of type A” in the instructions) that stayed together during the en-
tire experiment. Per period, each participant received an endowment of 20 talers. Players of type 
A could decide how many talers to invest in a project. Each taler contributed to the project cre-
ated a marginal per capita return of 0.4. Before the start of the game, per group one additional 
subject was randomly assigned as the group supervisor whom we called “player of type B” in the 
instructions. In each round supervisors were informed about the individual contributions of each 
type A-player. Supervisors had the same endowment and the same marginal per capita return 
from the project. However, they could not contribute. Rather they could spend their endowment 
on individually punishing the type A-players. For type B players, contributions of type A players 
thus are the equivalent of a levy from which a public official is financed. Following Fehr and 
Gächter (2002), the punishment technology was linear: one taler invested for punishment de-
stroyed three talers of the punished player.  
Our experiment consisted of two phases. The first group of four type A players in phase 1 was 
followed by a second phase with a fresh group of four subjects. Also the second phase consisted 
of ex ante announced 10 rounds. Only the supervisor stayed the same in both phases. Before 
starting to play themselves, the second group received graphs informing them about the perform-
ance and/or received punishment in their respective group of predecessors.  
Our three treatments differed in the degree of feedback for type A-players. An overview of the 
differences in feedback is provided in Table 1. In each phase feedback is provided about previ-
ous rounds, and in phase 2 also about play of the respective group in phase 1. In treatments low 
and medium, the supervisor cannot identify players of type A across periods. By contrast, in 





                                        
2    The translation of the instructions for one of our treatments are provided in the appendix. Original instruc-
tions were in German. All instructions can be obtained on request from the authors. 7 
Treatment  feedback about previous rounds  feedback about all rounds in previous 
phase (in phase 2 only) 
low 
 
• average  contributions 
•  own received punishment 
• average  contributions 
 
medium 
(in addition to infor-
mation provided in 
low) 
 
•  average received punishment  •  average received punishment 
high 
(in addition to infor-
mation provided in 
medium) 
 
• individual  contributions 
• individual  earnings 
•  individual received punishment 
• individual  contributions 
• individual  earnings 
•  individual received punishment 
 
Table 1 
Feedback Provided to Type A-Players in Different Treatments 
 
Of course, in a number of respects, our design differs from the reality of criminal policy. Stakes 
are much lower, both for society and for the “offender”. But we keep the basic dilemma structure 
that also underlies most criminal offenses: the criminal is best off if she ignores the harm she 
inflicts on other members of society. Also there is no criminal code. Norms are implicit in our 
setting. They result from the sanctioning policy of the supervisor. Yet in criminal policy, a re-
lated effect is not uncommon: the criminal authorities use the degrees of freedom they dispose of 
to flexibly react to crime, despite the fact that, at face value, criminal offenses are precisely de-
fined in the respective penal code. Finally, in our experiment, sanctioning is not accompanied by 
words that express social disapproval or moral indignation. In the experiment, all value judge-
ment is through correctional action. The effect of the negative incentive is less visibly backed up 
by appealing to the offender’s identity as a member of this one society. 
Yet in recompense for the slight reduction of external validity, our design gives us control over 
elements that have plagued criminal policy and empirical research alike. Our supervisor benefits 
directly from the contributions of group members to the project. They cannot personally identify 
group members so that repeated game effects after the experiment are not an issue. Effects of 
retribution can be excluded (cf. Wood 2002). Incapacitation is impossible in our setting (cf. 
Kessler and Levitt 1999). Intervention cannot shift criminal activity to another location (cf. Ha-
kim, Spiegel et al. 1984). Victims cannot respond by moving to a different town or quarter (cf. 
Anderson 1990). Players are perfectly symmetric, so that bystanders have no reason to expect 
that they will be treated any differently if they behave the same way (cf. Robinson and Darley 
2003:973). Since each round only lasts minutes, arguably discounting should be negligible (cf. 
Levitt 1998:353).  
Given our completely neutral framing and decontextualisation and the fact that there cannot be 
competing tasks, we need not be too much concerned about impulsivity (cf. Shepherd 2004) or 
about crime as symbol (cf. Matsueda, Kreager et al. 2006:103). The risk of sanction mispercep-
tion (Nagin 1998b:19) is minimized. Subjects are perfectly informed about punishment inflicted 
on themselves and, depending on our treatments, on others. Arguably, habituation does not mat-8 
ter, given that players only play 10 rounds, and that the entire experiment lasts little longer than 
an hour (cf. Hawkins 1969:560). Again due to anonymity, the fact that would-be offenders are 
members of a peer group with criminal propensity cannot explain behavior (cf. Kahan 
1997a:2486). Punishment cannot serve as a "badge of honor" (cf. Wilson and Herrnstein 
1985:304). Moral credibility (cf. Kahan 1997a:2481) and the mirror concept of moral condemna-
tion (cf. Kahan 1997b:383) cannot matter either. We deliberately do not speak of "punishment", 
but only of a "reduction of income". The supervisor is neutrally labeled as a "player of type B". 
Thereby we reduce the expressive function of punishment (cf. Kahan 1997a:2483) to a mini-
mum. Since we guarantee anonymity, formal sanctions cannot be supplemented or comple-
mented by informal sanctions in treatments low and medium (cf. Cameron 1988:302). In treat-
ment high, free-riders are labeled (cf. Lemert 1951; Becker 1963). But other group members do 
not have an opportunity for a targeted reaction. 
Our treatments discriminate between several explanations for the effect of punishment. The 
treatments are directly targeted to sanction risk perception (cf. Nagin 1998b:1, criticizing the 
absence of empirical evidence on this). In treatment low, subjects do not get feedback about 
sanctions directed to other group members. Consequently participants not punished themselves 
in the respective period (whom, as a shorthand, we call loyals) can at best be indirectly influ-
enced by the sanctioning policy of their respective supervisor, through its effect on contributions. 
This is different in treatment medium. However, loyals still do not learn the precise response of 
the supervisor to a specific deviation from the (implicit) group norm. This information is only 
available in treatment high.  
We can precisely disentangle personal and vicarious experiences (cf. Stafford and Warr 1993). In 
treatment low, vicarious experiences are excluded by design. In treatments medium and high, in 
the first round of phase 2, all experiences are vicarious. In all other rounds of both phases, cul-
prits combine personal with vicarious experiences, whereas loyals make differently precise vi-
carious experiences only. This makes it also possible to test for the resetting effect (cf. Pogarsky 
and Piquero 2003). 
In two complementary ways, we can analyze the effect of ambiguity and uncertainty (cf. Nagin 
1998b:11). In treatment low, loyals are completely uncertain about the sanctioning policy of their 
supervisor. In treatments medium and high, in phase 2 players can adjust their behavior to the 
sanctioning policy from phase 1. Also in treatments medium and high, we can test how the con-
sistency of the respective supervisor (cf. Katyal 1997:2451) plays itself out in contribution rates. 
If there is stigmatization (Harel and Klement 2007), this should become visible in comparing 
treatments medium and high. For only in treatment high, culprits are individualized with a repu-
tation over rounds. 
A final advantage of our design results from the character of our dependent variable. In the field, 
and in criminological research on recidivism for that matter, it usually is binary: either a person 
abides by the law, or she breaks it. In our experiment, contributions are (quasi) continuous, on a 
scale from 0 to 20. We therefore cannot only investigate whether those who have been punished, 9 
or those who observe how others are punished, respect the law in the future. We can also meas-
ure how much they contribute to the public project. Along with this, we get a meaningful dy-
namic measure. We can investigate, by how much a participant changes her contribution level 
after punishment, or upon observing punishment in action. 
Participants received a show up fee of 2.50 €. Theoretically, subjects could make real losses. 
Since the lab has built a reputation that subjects do not put their own money at risk, we gave 
them an extra 50 talers at the beginning of the experiment, explicitly motivated to cater for po-
tential losses. Earnings were individually and anonymously paid out to all participants at an ex-
change rate of 0.04 € per taler. On average, total earnings of contributors were 22.23 € (sd 2.64, 
range [12.07, 33.3]). Total earnings of supervisors, who played 20 periods each, were on average 
45.60 € (standard deviation 5.51, range [34.36, 56.71]).  
V. Results 
1. Anticipation 
In the first period of the first phase, active players have no own or vicarious experiences with the 
respective punishment institution. But they are fully informed about institutional design. Is this 
information sufficient to induce different behavior in different treatments? Is a potential effect of 
the institution anticipated? Although descriptive figures point into the direction of the treatment 
effects
3, if we only consider data from the first period we do not find a significant effect of the 
treatments, neither if we test non-parametrically
4 nor if we test parametrically.
5 
2. Phase  1 
a.  Full Transparency Reduces Contributions 
Contributions and deductions through punishment were as in Figure 2 and in Table 2. In the Ap-
pendix, we also provide graphs for individual groups. Our main result is visible immediately: full 
transparency hurts, while partial transparency is immaterial. In treatment high, absolute contribu-
tions are lower than in the remaining two treatments. The difference in absolute contributions 
results from less favorable contribution dynamics. While contributions rise quickly in treatments 
low and medium, they remain almost stable in treatment high. Visual inspection suggests that 
                                        
3   Mean contributions are low 14.521, medium 14.563, high 13.208. 
4   Mann Whitney, low vs. medium, N = 96, p = .932; low vs. high, p = .2955; medium vs. high, p = .2514. All 
tests are two-sided. Note that in the first period individual contribution decisions are still fully independent of 
each other. 
5   In the first period, 61 out of 144 (active) participants contribute their entire endowment of 20 taler. 4 keep the 
whole endowment for themselves. This data structure makes a Tobit model appropriate. In this model, treat-
ment high is the reference category. Regressors for treatments low (p = .229) and medium (p = .184) are in-
dependently and jointly insignificant (Wald test, F(2, 142) = 1.09, p = .3376).  10 
informing participants about average punishment, i.e. the difference between treatments low and 
medium, is close to irrelevant. 
 
Phase first  second 
treatment contr recpun contr recpun
Low 17.45 1.7  18.07 1.65 
Medium 16.99 2.68 18.18 1.72 
high 14.02 2.84  15  1.85 
 
Table 2 
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For this and all later non-parametric tests, we consider means over the first ten rounds. We report 
p-values from two-sided tests. If we compare treatments, we use a Mann-Whitney test. In this 
test, the difference between low and high is indeed weakly significant (N = 24, p = .0647), while 
the remaining comparisons are insignificant. In the Appendix, we explain our strategy for para-
metric estimation. Using this strategy, in the regression of Table 3 we establish significantly 
higher contributions in the low  and  medium treatments, compared to treatment high, which 
serves as the reference category; the endgame effect is captured by the regressor for the final pe-
riod.
6 Full feedback (high) thus reduces contributions. We squarely refute H1: contributions are 
lower, the more punishment information is available.  
 
 
                                        
6   On the mirror model that ignores censoring and clustering, the Hausman test is insignificant, which indicates 
that we are justified to prefer the more efficient random effects over the fixed effects model. 11 
low  8.185** 
medium  6.749* 
final period  -1.283 
cons  16.847*** 
N  1440 
left censored  52 
right censored  784 
p model  <.001 
 
Table 3 
Parametric Test of Treatment Effects 
depvar: contribution  
random effects Tobit, bootstrapped at the group level, 500 reps 
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05 
 
Making average punishment explicit (medium) does not significantly improve contributions, as 
shown by a Wald test of the null hypothesis that coefficients for low and medium are the same (p 
= .6096).  
b.  Impression Management is Key 
As the models of Table 4 show, contributions in the next periods are chiefly explained by contri-
butions in the respective previous periods. In both models, apart from the regressor for the end-
game effect, this is the only regressor that is significant at conventional levels. Actually it is 
highly significant.
7 Those who have not been punished in the previous period contribute more, 
but this effect is only weakly significant, model 2. This is not just a sign of stickiness or conser-
vatism. As has been shown, in motivational terms groups tend to be heterogeneous. There is a 
small fraction of true altruists, and a somewhat larger fraction of profit maximizing egoists. Yet 
most group members are conditional cooperators. They are happy to contribute (much) to the 
public project, as long as they perceive other group members to contribute (much) as well 
(Fischbacher, Gächter et al. 2001; Fischbacher and Gächter 2009). Conditional cooperators need 
not be deterred. But they care about the risk of being “the sucker”. Hence they care about a sig-
nal of expected cooperativeness in their group. As the regressions of Table 4 demonstrate, aver-






                                        
7   For both models, if one conducts the Hausman test on the mirror model that ignores censoring and clustering, 
it is significant. The problem can, however, be remedied by a Hausman Taylor model, see Appendix for 
methodology. In this model, we treat regressor “final” as exogenous. 12 
  model 1  model 2 
not punished 




in previous round 
1.502*** 1.475*** 
Low 5.224  5.365 
Lavcontr*low -.140  -.153 
Medium 1.540  1.798 
Lavcontr*medium .041 .029 
final period  -3.155*** -3.241***
Cons -4.272*  -4.515* 
N 1296  1296 
p model  <.001  <.001 
 
Table 4 
Effect of Observed Cooperativeness 
depvar: contribution 
Lavcontr: average contribution in previous period  
random effects Tobit, bootstrapped at the group level, 500 reps 
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, 
+ p < .1 
 
c.  Starting a Virtuous Cycle 
Supervisors in our experiment seem to try to establish a norm of high cooperation right from the 
beginning. Inspecting Figure 2, one realizes that contributions in treatments low and medium on 
the one hand and treatment high on the other hand differ most in the beginning. In all treatments, 
there is quite some punishment in early rounds. The amount of punishment in period 1 does not 
significantly differ between treatments, neither in a nonparametric (Mann Whitney, N = 24, low 
vs. high, p = .8165; low vs. medium, p = .6215; medium vs. high, p = .8391) nor in a parametric 
test.
8 However, the substantial intervention works well in low  and medium, while it is only 
mildly effective in high. Actually, in medium, active players do not immediately adjust to the 
implicit group norm. It takes one more period until contributions jump up. Yet if one compares 
the difference between period 1 and period 3 contributions, at the group level one establishes a 
significant difference between low and high (Mann Whitney, N = 24, p = .0119) and a weakly 
significant difference between medium vs. high (p = .0937).  
d.  The Indirect Effect of Punishment 
Why does punishment seem to work better if individual contributions and punishment are less 
visible? Let us first show that punishment works. If it works, it induces punishees to increase 
their contributions. We therefore work with first differences of contributions as the dependent 
variable. In the regression of Table 5, the dummy for not having been punished in the previous 
                                        
8   If one regresses average punishment per group on treatment dummies, the dummies are insignificant, low p = 
.723, medium p = .737.  13 
period is highly significant (z = -5.69) and strongly negative.
9 This implies that those who have 
been punished are much more likely to increase their contributions than those who have not. 
However, both in low and in medium, the treatment effect and its interaction with not having 
been punished in the previous period more or less cancel out. Since the negative main effect of 
not having been punished is bigger than the positive constant, in all three treatments the model 
predicts that those not punished slightly reduce their contributions (-.439 in low, -.625 in me-
dium, -.530 in high). Wald tests show that, for those not punished in the previous period, there is 
no difference between treatments (low vs. medium, p = .5790; low vs. high, p = .8031; medium 
vs. high, p = .8110).
10 Consequently, in a dynamic perspective, the difference between treatments 
does not originate in the reaction of those who have not been punished.  
The critical difference is the reaction of those who have received punishment. In all treatments 
they increase their contributions. However, the increase is the bigger the less punishment is 
transparent (4.184 in low, 2.982 in medium, 1.740 in high); the treatment effect adds to the con-
stant. The more punishment is transparent, the less it works on those to whom it has been ad-
dressed. 
 





final period  -1.217** 
Cons 1.740*** 
N 1296 
p model  <.001 
R
2 within  .1959 
R
2 between  .1164 
R
2 overall  .1562 
 
Table 5 
Explaining Changes in Contributions 
Random effects, robust standard errors, clustered for groups 
Linnoc: not punished in previous period 
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05 
 
 
To appreciate this finding, it is informative to separately consider those who have and who have 
not been punished in the previous period, which we do in Figure 3 for the critical first three peri-
ods. In all treatments, those who have been punished are more likely to increase their contribu-
                                        
9   Data on first differences is not censored, so that there is no need for Tobit. The Hausman test on the mirror 
model that ignores clustering turns out significant. But the problem can be remedied by a Hausman Taylor 
model, again treating regressor “final” as exogenous.. 
10   To illustrate methodology: for the first comparison, we test the nul hypothesis (linnoc +) medium + me-
dium*linnoc = (linnoc +) low + low*linnoc. 14 
tions than those who have not (Mann Whitney, N = 68, p = .0029).
11 Most of those not punished 
do not change their contribution level at all. If they had made substantial contributions in the first 
round, this is good news. If, however, first-round contributions were low, it is bad policy for the 
supervisor not to intervene. Most importantly, it is very rare in low for a punished participant to 
reduce her contributions in response. This is more frequent in medium, and much more frequent 
in high.
12 In criminological parlance: the higher punishment transparency, the more pronounced 
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depvar: contr[2] – contr[1], contr[3] – contr[2] 
indepvar: dummy that is 1 if the participant has been punished in period 1 (for the first change) and in period 2 (for 
the second change)  
 
e.  Why Does Transparency Make Punishment Less Effective? 
We therefore must look out for reasons why higher transparency might make punishment less 
effective. A first hint is provided by the regression in Table 6.
13 The more a participant has been 
punished in the previous period the less she contributes in the following period. Since we have 
                                        
11   Two datapoints per group, one is the average of those who have not been punished, the other is the average of 
those who have been punished. Punishment is considered for periods 1 and 2, the dependent variable for pe-
riods 2 and 3. N < 72 results from the fact that in 3 groups nobody was punished, and in 1 group all were 
punished. 
12   The difference between low and high is significant, Mann Whitney, N = 22, p = .0269; the difference be-
tween medium and high is weakly significant, N = 23, p = .0647. 
13   Once more, on the mirror model that ignores censoring and clustering, the Hausman test turns out significant, 
but the problem can be remedied by a Hausman Taylor model. 15 
already shown that punishment has a positive effect on changes of contributions (Table 5), we 
can conclude that the reaction to punishment is imperfect. Punishment induces participants to 
adjust their behavior. But they do not immediately realign with the implicit group norm.  
In treatment high, this is patent. All participants know how much all other individual participants 
have contributed in each period, and by how much they have been punished in response. In 
treatment medium, participants only have a noisy signal of the sensitivity to punishment. In 
treatment low, they only see two things: how they have been punished themselves, and the effect 
of total punishment on contributions. Interestingly, since we have shown that contribution dy-
namics do not differ across treatments for those who have not been punished (Table 5), the dif-
ferences in information across treatments are not relevant for these participants. Primarily, they 
seem to orient themselves to the contribution level in the previous period (Table 4). By contrast, 
those who have been punished are sensitive to this information (Table 5).  
 
received punishment points 
in previous period  -.849* 
Low  8.419** 
Lrecpun*low  .561 
medium  7.143* 
Lrecpun*medium  .018 
final period  -2.097* 
Cons  17.941*** 
N  1296 
left censored  48 
right censored  723 
p model  <.001 
 
Table 6 
Effect of Received Punishment on Absolute Contributions 
depvar: contribution 
Lrecpun: received punishment points in previous period 
random effects Tobit, bootstrapped at the group level, 500 reps 
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, 
+ p < .1 
 
 
The critical question is this: on which pieces of information do participants condition their be-
havior − in particular those who have been punished in the previous period? Since treatments 
mainly differ with respect to contribution dynamics, in the following we focus on this dependent 
variable. 
In all treatments, two pieces of information are available. The participant recalls how severely 
and how consistently she has been punished herself. We measure severity the following way: for 









Our first independent variable is the average of this measure for all past periods, per individual. 
The second independent variable measures the consistency of punishment as the standard devia-
tion of the severity variable, again for all past periods and separately per individual. We also in-
teract these two variables with received punishment in the previous period. The main effect for 
past severity is insignificant, but there is a highly significant interaction with received punish-
ment. The more punishment has been severe in the past, the less punishment now is effective 
(models 1 and 3).
14 There is also a weakly significant effect of past punishment consistency, in 
the expected direction: the more punishment has been inconsistent in the past, the less partici-
pants increase their contributions now (model 2). Interestingly, if one adds past severity and its 
interaction with punishment in the previous period, the main effect of past inconsistency is no 
longer significant. We then, however, establish a significant interaction with received punish-
ment in the previous period (model 3). Surprisingly, the higher punishment now, the more par-
ticipants increase their contributions if punishment has been (fairly) inconsistent in the past. This 
finding is, however, in line with research aiming at establishing a potentially beneficial effect of 
ambiguity in (criminal) law (Baker, Harel et al. 2004; Horovitz and Segal 2006). With these 
qualifications, we thus support H2. 
 
  model 1  model 2  model 3 
received punishment points 
in previous period 
1.636*** .807***  1.646*** 
past severity of individual 
Punishment 
-1.260   -1.322 
Lrecpun*Lsevindpun -1.460***    -1.822*** 
past inconsistency of  
individual punishment 
 -1.481
+  -.922 
Lrecpun*Linconindpun   -.319  .907** 
Low .653
+ .495  .535 
Medium  .426 .446 .544 
Final  -1.342*** -1.348*** -1.328*** 
Cons -.701**  -.447  -.624* 
N  1296 1150 1150 
R
2  within  .3062 .2645 .3332 
R
2  between  .0731 .0318 .0406 
R
2  overall  .2221 .1584 .2361 
p  model  <.001 <.001 <.001 
 
Table 7 
Explaining Changes in Contributions with Individual Punishment Experiences 
depvar: changes in contributions 
Lrecpun: received punishment in previous period 
Lsevindpun: past severity of individual punishment 
Linconindpun: past inconsistency of individual punishment 
Random effects, robust standard errors, clustered for groups 
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, 
+ p < .1 
 
 
                                        
14   On all mirror models that ignore clustering, the Hausman test turns out significant, but the problem can be 
remedied by a Hausman Taylor model. In models 2 and 3, the N is smaller since calculating the standard de-
viation is impossible for a single observation, per participant. 17 
In treatments medium and high, participants also learn how intensely the supervisor has exer-
cised her punishment power. Do they use this information? As model 1 in Table 8 shows, there is 
no significant main effect of the information about total punishment in the previous period. 
However the interaction effect is significant.
15 Since we know that, overall, those unpunished do 
not change their contribution level, we can conclude that this information works as one would 
expect: those who have been punished react more sensitively if the supervisor punishes more 
intensely. This can be interpreted as a (small) severity effect, in line with H2.  
 
 model  1  model 2 
not punished in previous period  -2.188*** -2.609*** 
total punishment in previous period .072   
past sensitivity of punishment level 
to contribution level    .103 
Linnoc*Ltotpun -.171*   
Linnoc*Lpunrat   -.343 
Medium .296  .304 
Final period  -1.086*  -1.086* 
cons 1.672***  2.021*** 
N 864  864 
p model  <.001  <.001 
R
2 within  .1764  .1669 
R
2 between  .1039  .0942 
R
2 overall  .1351  .1287 
 
Table 8 
Effect of Additional Information Available in medium and high 
depvar: changes in contributions 
Random effects, robust standard errors, clustered for groups 
Linnoc: not punished in previous period; Ltotpun: total punishment in previous period; 
Lpunrat: past sensitivity of punishment level to contribution level 
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05 
 
 
Since participants both know the development of contributions and of punishment, they are also 
in a position to estimate their supervisor’s sensitivity to the level of contributions. To measure 
the severity of punishment for contributions below the possible maximum contribution we define 










is calculated. This is averaged over all past periods. The result is lagged by one period. As model 
2 of Table 8 shows, there is no significant reaction to this information (p = .589).  
 
                                        
15   Again the Hausman test turns out significant, but the problem can be remedied by a Hausman Taylor model. 18 
In treatment high, participants see individual contributions and how the supervisor reacted to 
them. How does this additional information influence their behavior, in particular the behavior of 
those who have been punished in the previous period? Participants are indeed sensitive to infor-
mation about the lowest contribution in the previous round (Table 9, model 1).
16 More interest-
ingly even, those who have been punished do not react the same way as those who have not. For 
those who have not been punished, we must add up the negative main effect and the positive in-
teraction effect. Since the balance is positive, such participants react favorably. The higher the 
minimum contribution in the previous period, the more they increase their contributions in the 
subsequent period. The opposite is true for those who have been punished. They show a perverse 
reaction. The higher the minimum contribution in the previous period, the less they increase their 
contribution now, despite the fact that they have been punished. 
In treatment high, participants also see how far the minimum and maximum contributions have 
been apart in the previous period. Model 2 of Table 9 demonstrates that they also condition their 
behavior on this information. Again those who have been punished use this information in a 
diametrically opposed way to how it is used by those not punished. If the distance was big, this 
induces those who have been punished to adjust contributions upwards, whereas those who have 
not been punished adjust contributions downwards. This makes sense. It describes a movement 
of convergence towards the group mean. 
In treatment high, participants also have more information about the relationship between contri-
butions and punishment. Regressor punishment severity is the coefficient of an OLS model that 
regresses received punishment on contribution. Regressor punishment inconsistency is the stan-
dard error of this coefficient. Both the coefficient and the standard error are calculated for all 
previous periods. For instance in period 4, they cover information from periods 1-3. We do not 
find a statistically significant effect of information on punishment severity, model 3. The effect 
of information on punishment inconsistency again differs between those who have been pun-
ished and those who have not, model 4. The significant interaction effect is best interpreted from 
the perspective of those who have been punished. For them, the sign is not swapped. Conse-
quently, the less punishment was consistent in the past, the less they increase their contributions 
now. Interestingly, if we interact severity and consistency, both consistency and the interaction 
are significant, model 5. Severity has a negative effect if it is coupled with high inconsistency. 





                                        
16   If we estimate the models of Table 9 as random effects models, the Hausman test turns out significant. Since 
all models only work with time variant regressors, there is no need for a Hausman Taylor model. We just use 
the fixed effects model. 19 
 model  1  model 2  model 3  model 4  model 5 
not punished in previous period  -4.850**  -1.295 -2.485 -4.060***  -3.795** 
lowest contribution in previous round  -.134
+       
Linnoc*Lmincontr .151*       
distance between minimum and maximum 
contribution in previous round    .196**      
Linnoc*Ldistcontr   -.273***      
past severity of punishment     -3.793    9.955 
Linnoc*sevpun    4.110     
past inconsistency of punishment      -4.008  -49.079* 
Linnoc*inconstpun     12.450   
sevpun*inconstpun       -162.030** 
final period  -.002  -.184 .078  .106  -.020 
cons 3.523***  .638 1.428  2.703***  5.508* 
N 432  432 428 428  428 
p model  <.001  <.001 .0007 <.001  .0015 
R
2 within  .1218  .1404 .1173 .1126  .1377 
R
2 between  .1073  .1311 .1046 .1049  .0030 
R
2 overall  .0876  .1047 .0838 .0825  .0422 
 
Table 9 
Effect of Information Only Available in high on Contribution Dynamics 
depvar: changes in contributions 
Linnoc: not punished in the previous period; Lmincontr: smallest contribution in previous round; 
Ldistcontr: difference between minimum and maximum contribution in previous round; 
sevpun: coefficient of contribution in regression explaining punishment 
inconstpun: standard error of this coefficient 
fixed effects, robust standard errors, clustered for groups 
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, 
+ p < .1 
 
f.  Testing the Hypotheses 
What do we learn from Phase 1 results for our hypotheses? In our experiment, letting everyone 
see the criminal system in action does not help, but hurts. We refute H1. In line with H2, partici-
pants are sensitive to the severity and consistency of punishment they have received themselves, 
Table 7. Information about average sensitivity of punishment to the average level of contribu-
tions is immaterial though, but those who have been punished in the previous period are more 
influenced by information about the total amount of punishment than those not punished, Table 
8. Information about punishment consistency is only available in treatment high. In this treat-
ment, contributions are lowest. This seems to speak against the relevance of overall consistency 
for deterrence. Evidence from treatment high points into the same direction. If consistency in-
formation is provided, only those who have been punished are sensitive to it, Table 9. The solu-
tion is provided by model 5 in Table 9. Consistency and severity interact. While severity does 
not have a beneficial main effect, it aggravates the negative effect of inconsistency. This quali-
fies H2.  
 20 
We partly support H3. Those who have not been punished do indeed contribute more, Table 6. 
However, information about total punishment and about the average sensitivity of punishment to 
behavior is immaterial for this, Table 8, as is information about the relationship between behav-
ior and punishment at the individual level, Table 5. For those not punished, the criminal system 
exclusively matters indirectly, through its effect on the general willingness to contribute to the 
common cause, Table 4. 
3. Foreign  Experiences 
In period 11, i.e. in the first period of phase 2, participants contribute significantly more in 
treatment low versus high (Mann Whitney, N = 24, p = .0371) and in treatment medium versus 
high (Mann Whitney, N = 24, p = .0485), while the difference between low and medium is insig-
nificant. Comparing contributions, per group, between periods 1 and 11, there is a significant 
difference in treatment low (Wilcoxon, N = 24, p = .0205), but not in the remaining treatments. 
Hence the disadvantage of full transparency carries over to the next generation of players. Know-
ing everything about how strangers have been treated by the supervisor is similarly detrimental 
as knowing the same about one’s own community. 
In period 11, new active players can only rely on foreign experiences to guide their behavior. 
They have not yet made their own experiences. As the regressions in Table 10 show, vicarious 
learning does indeed take place (Stafford and Warr 1993) (for the psychological background, see 
Bandura 1977). By far the most important factor, both in terms of significance and effect size, is 
the one that also had the highest explanatory power during phase 1: average contributions. But 
the development of contributions over time also has a significantly positive effect. This inde-
pendent variable is the coefficient of a Tobit model that regresses contributions on period, con-
trolling for the endgame effect by an additional coefficient for period 10, separately for each 
group.  
Model 2 checks the effect of those additional pieces of information about the first phase that are 
only available in treatments medium and high. Actually, the additional information is of little 
relevance. The only weakly significant effect concerns severity of punishment. It has a strongly 
negative effect in treatment high, while it is beneficial in treatment medium. This independent 
variable is the coefficient of a linear regression explaining received punishment in the first phase 
with contributions, separately for each group. None of the additional pieces that are only avail-













low  -.035    
medium  .724 -3.653   
average contributions in phase 1  .643*** 1.100***  1.028** 
medium*avcontrphase1   -.389   
development of contributions  
over time in phase 1  .131** .441  .439 
medium*trendcontrphase1   -.160   
average punishment in phase 1   1.809  1.837 
medium*punphase1   3.734   
severity of punishment in phase 1   -16.780
+  15.521 
medium*punsev1   20.572
+  
inconsistency of punishment  
in phase 1     -15.950 
cons  6.349** 3.313
+ 4.030 
N  144 92  48 
left censored  2 2  1 
right censored  61 39  15 
p model  <.001 <.001  .0018 
pseudo R
2  .0327 .0730  .0576 
 
Table 10 
Explaining Contributions in Period 11 
Tobit, robust standard errors, clustered for groups 
avcontrphase1: average contributions in phase 1 
trendcontrphase1: development of contributions over time in phase 1 
punphase1: average punishment in phase 1; punsev1: severity of punishment in phase 1 
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, 
+ p < .1 
 
The most important piece of news concerns H3. Players are not only contributing more if they 
know that their own group has contributed more. It suffices if they learn that a group managed 
by the same supervisor has made high contributions, Figure 4. Vicarious experiences matter the 
same way as own experiences. Comparing treatments medium and high, we again refute H1. The 
effect comes through the fact that punishment information (both regarding the level of punish-
ment and its severity) is counterproductive in treatment high, while it is productive in treatment 
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Relation of Contributions in Period 11 to Contributions of Predecessor Group 
4.  Own and Foreign Experiences Interacting 
From period 12 on, own and foreign experiences interact.
17 The two models of   
Table 11 contrast a static with a dynamic perspective. In both perspectives, the fundamental pic-
ture is the same as without foreign experiences. Absolute contributions are chiefly explained by 
average contributions in the previous round (z = 4.482). Note that the coefficient is even bigger 
than 1. In the following period, participants on average contribute even more than they had on 
average contributed in the previous period. In a dynamic perspective, again received punishment 
is the strongest predictor (z = 13.21). If they have been punished, participants increase their con-
tributions − the more so, the more punishment they have received. 
The level of contributions in the group of predecessors is insignificant in the model explaining 
levels, and it is only marginally significant in the model explaining first differences. Since this 
independent variable was crucial for explaining contributions in the initial period of the second 
group (Table 10), we conclude that vicarious experiences are replaced by own experiences as 
soon as they are available. In a dynamic perspective, the trend of contributions in the predecessor 
group keeps explanatory power. Yet through the interaction effects, it becomes clear that this 
only matters for treatment high. This makes sense. From the second period on, participants have 
their own experiences regarding the level of contributions, but they lack experiences about con-
                                        
17   Again, for all models in, the Hausman test is significant, but the problem can be remedied by a Hausman 
Taylor model. 23 
tribution dynamics. In treatment high they use the information about the predecessor group as a 
proxy.  
For the dynamic model, in treatment low information about the level of contributions in the 
predecessor group has a more positive effect than in the other treatments. Yet it remains that re-
ceived punishment is less effective here than in the remaining two treatments. 
 
 model  1 
depvar absolute contributions 
model 2 
depvar first differences 
low  -10.558 -2.331* 
medium  4.322 .128 
average contribution per 
group in previous period  1.031***  
lavcontr*low  .063  
lavgrp*medium  -.258  
received punishment 
in previous period  -.115 1.096*** 
lrecpun*low  -.153 -.311* 
lrecpun*medium  -.750* -.054 
average contributions in phase 1  .108 -.076
+ 
low*avcontrphase1  .723 .178* 
medium*avcontrphase1  .186 .018 
development of contributions  
over time in phase 1  2.596 .310** 
low*trendcontrphase1  -2.443 -.308** 
medium* trendcontrphase1  -2.085 -.282** 
final period  -3.838*** -1.472*** 
cons  .409 .385 
N  1296 1296 
left censored  24  
right censored  814  
R
2 within   .3252 
R
2 between   .1601 
R
2 overall   .2581 
p model  <.001 <.001 
 
Table 11 
Explaining Contributions and Contribution Changes in Periods 12-20 
model 1: random effects Tobit, bootstrapped at the group level, 500 reps 
model 2: random effects, robust standard errors, clustered for groups 
lavcontr: average contribution per group in previous period 
(this variable and the interaction terms are omitted in model 2 since they would be endogenous) 
lrecpun: received punishment in previous period; avcontrphase1: average contributions in phase 1 
trendcontrphase1: development of contributions over time in phase 1 
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, 




Experiments are not meant to portray the richness of the criminal system. They deliberately strip 
off context, in order to establish full control over the one feature that purportedly makes criminal 
sanctions effective. Jeremy Bentham had the conjecture that punishment must be made transpar-
ent if it is to guide those who have not been punished themselves.  
Given our results, we cannot but conclude: as a policy maker, Jeremy Bentham did not seem to 
get it right. At least in our experiment, if contributions and punishments are transparent, the will-
ingness to contribute to the common cause decays. Even more disturbingly: actual sanctions be-
come less effective, the better would-be low contributors can observe how (mildly) the criminal 
system reacts to offenses. The results suggest that instead of building panopticon prisons in the 
town centre, government should conceal prisons from public scrutiny. Punishment serves society 
best if it remains a tool one does not see in action when applied to others. What really matters is 
information about normabiding behavior of other members of society. To use a metaphor that 
features prominently in criminal policy: government should spend money on repairing broken 
windows, not on showcasing correctional action. 
Our experimental result is not only at variance with Jeremy Bentham’s advice. It also qualifies a 
strand of the criminological literature. We do find the expected effects of punishment severity 
and consistency if we consider the sanctions this one individual has received in the past. In the 
field, the effect might, however, be blurred by the fact that the second offense will often be 
qualitatively different from the first. Yet normally, if one speaks of consistency and severity as 
policy variables, one rather thinks of them at the level of society. At any rate, greater transpar-
ency only has an effect on the latter. In our setting overall punishment severity occasionally has a 
minor effect, as has punishment consistency. But both effects are at most marginally significant. 
What looks like the prime decision variable of criminal policy turns out to be at best secondary, 
while the main interest should be in the effects of punishment on reducing the amount and sever-
ity of crime in the first place.  
Nonetheless, this is a paper in the spirit of Jeremy Bentham. While he might have got it wrong as 
a policy maker, he got it totally right as an analyst. The main task of criminal policy is and ought 
to be that would-be criminals are induced to exhibit socially desirable behavior. Only the route to 
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Strategy for Parametric Estimation 
We have data from periods, nested in subjects, nested in groups. In many periods, many sub-
jects have contributed their entire endowment of 20. In some periods, some subjects have 
kept their entire endowment for themselves. Consequently, the contribution data is heavily 
right censored and slightly left censored. There are standard procedures to separately deal 
with both features of the data. The nested character is captured by a random or fixed effects 
model with standard errors clustered at the group level. Censoring is taken into account in a 
(random effects) Tobit model. Unfortunately there is no standard procedure for clustered and 
censored data. We solve the problem by bootstrapping the ordinary random effects model, 
with random draws clustered at the group level. Note that, if one were to ignore the fact that 
observations are not independent for members of one and the same group, i.e. if one did not 
cluster standard errors, coefficients would still be unbiased. Only the standard errors might be 
too small. Bootstrapping precisely targets this problem. It generates standard errors that take 
the clustering into account. In these estimations, we always work with 500 independent 
draws. 
 
A second statistical problem results from the fact that there is no generally acknowledged 
fixed effects estimator for censored data. Therefore we cannot perform the Hausman test on 
the random effects Tobit model. To nonetheless make sure that we are justified to use the 
more efficient random effects model, we rerun a mirror model that ignores censoring. This of 
course yields a standard random effects model. We rerun the model as a fixed effects model, 
and compare the coefficients by way of a Hausman test. In some models, the Hausman test 
turns out significant. We then are able to remedy the problem by a Hausman Taylor model. 
This saves the time invariant regressors, in particular the treatment effects, which would can-
cel out in the fixed effects model via mean differencing. The Hausman Taylor model instru-
ments the time variant regressors by the deviation from their mean, as in the fixed effects 
model, and it instruments the time invariant regressors by the mean of the exogenous time 
variant regressors (Hausman and Taylor 1981). A further Hausman test demonstrates that, in 
all instances where we need this procedure, it has been successful (Baltagi, Bresson et al. 
2003).  
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Instructions for Treatment High Second Phase 
(instructions for phase 1 and for phase 2, treatments low and medium are available upon request) 
 
 
General Instructions for Participants 
 
 
You are about to take part in an economics experiment. If you read the following instructions 
carefully, you will be able to earn a substantial sum of money, depending on the decisions you 
make. It is therefore very important that you read these instructions carefully.  
The instructions you have received are exclusively for your private information. There shall be 
absolutely no communication during the experiment. If you have questions, please ask us. 
Disobeying this rule will lead to exclusion from the experiment and any payments. 
The experiment consists of several parts. We will begin by explaining the first part. You will 
receive separate instructions for the other parts. 
You will definitely receive € 2.50 for participating in the experiment. During the experiment, the 
currency in operation is not euro, but taler. Your entire income is hence first calculated in taler. 
The total number of taler you will have accumulated in the course of the experiment will then be 
transferred into euro at the following rate:  
1 taler = 3 euro cent. 
At the end of the experiment, you will receive a cash payment, in euro, of whatever number of 
taler you have earned.  
Participants are divided into groups of five. In other words, there are 4 further participants in 
your group.  
All five participants in your group are taking part in this experiment for the first time. There are 
two roles: four participants, who have confirmed their presence at this experiment for two hours, 
are assigned Role A. Another person, who has confirmed his presence at this experiment for 4 
hours, is assigned Role B. 
The experiment is divided into individual periods, of which there are a total of 10. During these 
10 periods, the constellation of your group of five remains unchanged. You are therefore in the 
same group with the same people for 10 periods. During these 10 periods, the role you have 
been assigned also remains unchanged.  
At the beginning of the experiment, each participant is given a lump-sum payment of 50 taler.  
This occurs only once. You may cover possible losses with these 50 taler. 35 
The following pages give you an outline of the exact proceedings of the experiment. 
 
Information on the Exact Proceedings of the Experiment 
 
 
Each of the 10 periods consists of two steps. In Step 1, the participants who have been assigned 
Role A decide on contributions to a project. In Step 2, the participant who has Role B can reduce 
the income of the other (Role A) participants. At the beginning of each period, each participant 
receives 20 points, referred to henceforth as endowment. 
Step 1: 
In Step 1, only the four Role A participants in a group make a decision (should you have been 
assigned Role B, please read this part of the instructions anyway, in order to find out how a Role 
A participant can reach a decision). Your task is to reach a decision on how to use your endow-
ment. As a Role A participant, you have to decide how many of the 20 points you wish to pay 
into a project, and how many you wish to keep for yourself. The consequences of this decision 
are explained in more detail below.  
At the beginning of each period, the following input screen appears: 
The input screen: 
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On the top left corner of your screen, the period number is displayed.  
As already mentioned, your endowment in each period is 20 points. As a Role A participant, 
you have to make a decision on your project contribution by typing in a sum between 0 and 20 in 
the appropriate field. You may click on this window by using the mouse. As soon as you have 
determined the sum you wish to contribute, you have also decided on how many points you keep 
for yourself: 20 minus your contribution. Once you have keyed in your amount, press or click 
O.K., using the mouse or the Enter-key. As soon as you have done this, you can no longer make 
any changes to your decision. 
Your income from the contribution phase consists of two parts:  
(1)  the points that you have kept for yourself ("income from endowment kept")  
(2) the  "income from the project". The income from the project is calculated as follows:  
 
                      Your income from the project = 
                      0.4 times the total sum of contributions to the project 
 
 
Your income from the project, in taler, for one period is therefore 
(20 minus your contribution to the project) + 0.4* (total sum of contributions to the pro-
ject). 
The income of all other group members is calculated according to the same formula, i.e., each 
group member receives the same income from the project. If, for example, the sum of contribu-
tions from all group members is 60 points, then you and all other group members will receive a 
points income from the project of 0.4*60 = 24 taler. If the group members have contributed a 
total of 9 points to the project, you and all other group members will receive 0.4*9 = 3.6 taler as 
your income from the project. 
For each point that you keep for yourself, you earn an income of 1 taler. If instead you contribute 
one point from your endowment to your group project, then the sum of contributions to the pro-
ject increases by 1 point, and your income from the project increases by 0.4*1 = 0.4 taler. How-
ever, this also means that the income of all other group members increases by 0.4 taler, so that 
the total income of the group increases by 0.4*5 = 2 taler. Through your contributions to the pro-
ject, the other group members also increase their earnings. On the other hand, you also earn 
something from the contributions of the other group members to the project. For each point that 
another group member contributes to the project, you earn 0.4*1 = 0.4 taler. 
Please be aware that the Role B participant in a group cannot contribute to the project. This par-
ticipant receives the same income from the project as each Role A participant.  37 
Step 2: 
In Step 2, only the Role B participant in each group decides (should you have been assigned 
Role A, please read this part of the instructions anyway, in order to find out how a Role B par-
ticipant can reach a decision). As a Role B participant, you can reduce or leave unchanged the 
income of each of the other participants in Step 2, namely by assigning “points”. This becomes 
clear once you take a look at the input screen for Step 2: 
The input screen for Step 2 
 
 
Here you can see how much the individual Role A group members have contributed to the pro-
ject in this period. Please bear in mind that in each period the order in which the members of 
your group are displayed remains the same. Group members can be identified from period to 
period. 
Now it is up to you to decide for each Role A group member in this period whether you wish to 
allocate points and how many points you wish to distribute. Whatever you decide, you are 
obliged to enter a figure. If you do not wish to change the income of one particular group mem-
ber, please enter 0. If you enter a number higher than 0, you reduce this group member’s income. 38 
You can move within the input fields under the heading “points” by using the tabulator key (→|) 
or the mouse. 
If you allocate points, this costs you taler; the amount depends on the number of points you allo-
cate. Points are whole numbers between 0 and 20. The more points you allocate to a member of 
your group, the higher your costs are. The following formula gives you the correlation between 
points allocated and the costs of this allocation in taler:  
VII.  Cost of points allocated = Number of points allocated. 
Each allocated “point” therefore costs you 1 taler. For instance, if you allocate 2 points to a 
member, this costs you 2 taler; if, in addition, you allocate 9 points to another group member, 
this costs you 9 taler; if you allocate 0 points to the two other group members, there is no cost. 
You have therefore allocated a total of 11 points and your total cost is, hence, 11 taler 
(2+9+0+0). If you press Kostenberechnung (Calculate cost), the total cost is shown to you. 
Unless you have already clicked Continue, you may still change your decision.  
If you choose 0 points for a particular group member, you do not change this group member’s 
income. If, however, you allocate one point to a member (i.e., if you choose 1), you reduce this 
member’s income by 3 taler. If you allocate 2 points to a group member (i.e., if you choose 2), 
you reduce this member’s income by 6 taler, etc. For each point that you allocate to another 
group member, this member’s income is reduced by 3 taler.  
Please be aware that the Role A participants in a group cannot allocate points. The participant 
who has been assigned Role B can therefore not receive points in Step 2.  
The total taler income of a Role A participant after both steps is hence calculated according to 
the following formula: 
 
Taler income at the end of Step 2 for Role A = Period income for Role A = 
 
     = Income from Step 1  
      – 3*(sum of points received) 
 
 
The total taler income of a Role B participant is hence calculated according to the 
following formula after both steps: 
 
Taler income at the end of Step 2 for Role B = Period income for Role B = 
 
     = Income from Step 1 
       – Cost of points allocated by you 
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Please bear in mind that the taler income can also be negative for Role A participants at the end 
of Step 2. This could be the case whenever the income reduction from points received is higher 
than the income from Step 1.   
Once all participants have made their decision, a screen informs you of your period income and 
total income thus far.  
The income screen at the end of Step 2: 











If you have been allocated Role B, your screen looks as follows: 
 
  




Total income (in taler) from the experiment =  
 
= 50 + Sum of all period incomes, if the total is not negative.   
Otherwise, you receive 0 taler  
 
In addition, you are given the sum of 2.50 euro for showing up.    
  
 
As mentioned above, the member of your group who has been assigned Role B will take part in 
the same experiment on a further occasion. At the beginning of this future experiment, the new 
Role A participants, who will then form a group together with your participant B, will receive a 
chart for their information. This chart depicts the average contributions and the individual con-
tributions as well as the points received by the four individual Role A participants from your cur-41 
rent group over 10 periods. The four Role A participants from the future experiment will be dif-
ferent participants to those in this experiment. Only the Role B participant is the same person. 
The participants in the new group will be told that the chart depicts the behavior of the former 
group with the same Role B participant.} 
Do you have any further questions? If you do, please raise your hand from your booth – one of 
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